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Abstract 
Does socio-political context impact honesty at the individual level? 
By running an experiment among Germans collecting their passports 
or ID cards in the citizen centers of Berlin, we compared levels of 
honesty in individuals exposed to socialism and individuals exposed 
to capitalism. We find that individuals with an East German family 
background cheat significantly more on an abstract die-rolling task 
than those with a West German family background. In addition, the 
longer individuals were exposed to socialism, the more likely they 
were to cheat on our task. While it was recently argued that markets 
decay morals (Falk and Szech, 2013), our results suggest that other 
political and economic regimes such as socialism might have an even 
more detrimental effect on individuals’ behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Does the economic and political system affect people’s honesty? A recent article suggests that 
market economies decay morals, based on a clever experiment where participants faced a 
tradeoff of saving a mouse or receiving money (Falk and Szech, 2013). However, this study 
compared decisions in bilateral and multilateral market settings to individual decisions rather 
than an alternative economic allocation mechanism. Demsetz (1969) was the first to point out 
that the comparison of real institutions with an idealized arrangement constitutes a nirvana 
fallacy, and that it is more useful to compare existing institutional arrangements with one 
another. To understand how experience with real economic systems influences honesty, we 
compare dishonest behavior between East Germans, who were exposed to socialism for over 
40 years, and West Germans, who were at the same time living in a social market economy.  
While Falk and Szech (2013) found that market interactions erode moral values, we 
hypothesize that socialism might have an even more detrimental effect on human behavior. 
Socialist systems have been characterized by extensive scarcity, which ultimately led to the 
collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in East Germany. In many instances, 
socialism pressured or forced people to work around official laws. For instance, in East 
Germany stealing a load of building materials in order to trade it for a television set might 
have been the only way for a person delivering building supplies to connect to the outside 
world. Moreover, socialist systems have been characterized by a high degree of infiltration by 
the intelligence apparatus. In East Germany, the secret service (Staatssicherheit) kept records 
on more than one third of the citizens (Koehler, 1999). Unlike in democratic societies, 
freedom of speech did not represent a virtue in socialist regimes and it was therefore often 
necessary to misrepresent your thoughts to avoid repressions from the regime. All of these 
factors suggest that comparing the West German social market economy with the so-called 
‘really existing socialism’ in East Germany might reveal that under socialism, morals decay 
even more. 
Earlier studies have shown differing degrees of national solidarity between East and West 
Germans. In a laboratory experiment with economics students, Ockenfels and Weimann 
(1999) found that East Germans showed significantly less solidarity five years after the 
German reunification. When they asked Germans how much money they would be willing to 
hand over to anonymous future losers if they won 10 Deutsche Mark in a solidarity game, 
East Germans were willing to give up roughly half as much as West Germans. Interestingly, 
East Germans also expected to receive much less from potential winners. These results were 
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recently confirmed by Brosig-Koch et al. (2011), who showed that there was no convergence 
in solidarity 20 years after the German reunification, which they attribute to high levels of 
interpersonal coordination required to shift societal norms. 
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007) provide evidence that East Germans have stronger preferences for public policies that 
involve redistribution. They found that individual preferences are deeply shaped by the 
economic and political regime and converge only slowly. According to their estimates, one 
fourth of this effect is due to the fact that East Germans became poorer during the socialist 
epoch, while the remainder can be attributed to the impact of socialism on individual 
preferences itself. One limitation of the study by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) is that 
people might distort their true preferences when responding to a survey like GSOEP. For 
instance, people might overstate their willingness to contribute to redistributive policies 
because they do not actually have to pay for them. Using a discrete choice experiment, Pfarr 
et al. (2013) find that the stated preferences of East Germans towards redistribution indeed 
differ from their revealed preferences. While East Germans indicate to prefer higher degrees 
of redistribution, they are not willing to pay for such policies. 
Another study by Heineck and Süssmuth (2013) also used the GSOEP data and investigated 
the effect of the economic and political regime on individuals’ trust and risk preferences as 
well as their cooperativeness. East Germans showed persistently lower levels of social trust 
and were less inclined to see others as fair. Their study also suggested that East Germans are 
more risk-loving. Most importantly, Heineck and Süssmuth (2013) find that these cultural 
traits appear to carry down through generations. 
Little is known about how the economic and political system influences individual honesty. 
Torgler (2003) found that East Germans were more likely than West Germans to say that 
cheating on tax can be justified, although this difference disappeared 7 years after the German 
reunification. While taxation is a specific domain that is shaped by social norms and legal 
rules, here we are interested in whether East and West Germans differ in their honesty on an 
abstract task. A recent study by Abeler et al. (2012) provided 658 Germans with an 
opportunity to earn 15 EUR by misreporting the side of a coin toss on the telephone. The test 
did not reveal any cheating behavior among the subjects. Doubting the apparent honesty of 
Germans, we designed a study to test whether Germans are indeed perfectly honest and 
whether the economic and political system has a significant impact on people’s willingness to 
cheat for personal gain in an abstract task. In a second step, we tested whether the economic 
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and political system has a significant impact on people’s willingness to donate to a charitable 
cause, bearing in mind that donations might provide a specific method of moral cleansing 
after misconduct like cheating (see Ayal and Gino, 2011; Lee and Schwarz, 2010; Zhong and 
Liljenquist, 2006). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines our theory and 
hypothesis. In section 3, we present our sampling strategy and the experimental setup. Section 
4 provides descriptive statistics and the empirical results of our econometric models. Section 
5 provides a discussion and concludes. 
2. Theory and Hypothesis 
Standard economic theory focuses on external incentives and disincentives for dishonesty, 
including the personal gain, probability of punishment, and severity of punishment (Becker, 
1968). Based on the rational actor model, this theory claims that when penalties for 
dishonesty are absent, people should cheat to the maximal degree. However, in contrast to this 
hypothesis, a growing body of behavioral research finds that individual cheating is limited 
even when external penalties are absent (Gino et al., 2009; Jiang, 2013; John et al., 2013; 
Mazar et al., 2008). Based on such findings, Mazar et al. (2008) proposed that in addition to 
being motivated by external incentives, people are motivated by the desire to maintain an 
honest self-concept, which explains why they limit dishonesty in experimental contexts where 
they could earn more money by cheating. 
We posit that socialism extends the threshold below which average people can cheat and 
maintain a positive self-concept as being an honest and upright individual. This may be 
because the political and economic environment under socialism forced individuals to 
sidestep the legal and social norms more frequently to live a decent life. Over the course of 
time, citizens of the former GDR may have come to standardize dishonest behaviors more 
deeply then their West German neighbors. For example, in certain situations (unsuspicious in 
the Federal Republic of Germany) it might have been necessary for citizens of the former 
GDR to tell a lie when standing in front of a supposedly member of the secrete policy in order 
to avoid getting arrested. In the economic domain, cheating at work might have been the only 
way to fulfill the annual plan set forth by the responsible government agency (Staatliche 
Plankommission). While such behavior in principle could exist under capitalism as well, it 
was likely more inevitable in a system that worked through coercion in many areas of live and 
was characterized through extensive economic scarcity. If the socio-political context has a 
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lasting impact on individuals’ behavior, we should expect to see differences in honesty 
carrying forward after the German reunification. As a result, we hypothesize that individuals 
from East Germany will cheat more than individuals from West Germany on an abstract 
behavioral task. 
3. Sampling and Experimental Setup 
3.1. Sampling 
The experiment was run in the course of five days, from December 2, 2013 through 
December 6, 2013. We drew a random sample of 259 German citizens who collected their 
passport or ID card from the Berlin citizen centers (the so-called Bürgeramt). Two 
experimenters, one male and one female with East and West German family backgrounds, 
respectively, conducted the experiment. Experimenters operated independently and 
approached subjects as they came in the room and sat down. We ran the study in Berlin to 
minimize any effects of regional variations, such as income differences and local attitudes. 
We conducted the experiment in six different administrative regions and nine different citizen 
centers, including regions directly at the former border of the Berlin Wall (Neukölln, Mitte 
and Pankow) and regions in the East and West Berlin hinterlands (Zehlendorf, Steglitz and 
Weissensee).  
According to Article 1 of the German ID Card Law (Personalausweisgesetz), every German 
is required to possess and show upon request a passport or ID card from the age of sixteen. 
Passports and ID cards are valid for 10 years and have to be renewed thereafter. A fine of up 
to 5,000 EUR can be imposed in case of non-compliance. Hence, even Germans who do not 
need a passport or ID card for travel purposes have a strong incentive to possess at least one 
of the two documents. Furthermore, passports and ID cards have to be collected by the 
applicant itself. A proxy person can collect the documents only in narrowly defined 
exceptional cases.1 This set of requirements gives us some confidence that the people 
collecting their passport or ID card at the citizen center represent a random sample of the 
population of Berlin. In terms of the composition of our participant sample, only slightly more 
than half of the 134 subjects who reported being born in West Germany were born in West 
Berlin, while 65 subjects had moved to Berlin from other parts of West Germany. From the 
97 subjects born in East Germany, only 39 were born in East Berlin, while 58 had moved to 
Berlin from other parts of East Germany. These demographic characteristics suggest that our 
                                                
1  For details see: http://service.berlin.de/dienstleistung/324325/ 
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results might apply not only to the city of Berlin, but also to East and West Germany more 
generally. Finally, 24 now German citizens were born outside of Germany and four subjects 
did not provide their place of birth. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on demographics 
and our main explanatory variables for East and West Germans, respectively. 
[Table 1 around here] 
3.2. Experimental Setup 
In this natural experiment, subjects were assigned into two groups by the Berlin Wall, which 
separated East and West Germany from its erection on August 13, 1961 until its fall on 
November 9, 1989.  During this period, almost no West Germans migrated to East Germany, 
and only around 600,000 East Germans managed to migrate to West Germany, with the 
remaining 16.4 million confined to East Germany until the fall of the Wall (Heineck and 
Süssmuth, 2013). Given this relatively small level of migration, self-selection among East and 
West Germans is likely not a serious issue in our experiment (see Pfarr et al., 2013). 
Importantly, because Berlin citizen centers issue passports and ID cards to any citizen of 
Berlin, experimenters were blind with regard to the background of the subjects they were 
running the experiment on.  
After agreeing to participate, each subject received an envelope with six single 1 EUR coins, 
the maximal possible payout on the die task we used to measure cheating. Subjects were then 
asked to throw a physical die 40 times. To measure cheating, subjects were instructed to 
decide on one side of the die—top or bottom—in their mind, and to memorize their decision 
before rolling the die. They then threw the die and observed the outcome. Subjects were next 
instructed to record this outcome on a sheet of paper. Each time they threw the die, subjects 
could cheat by claiming that they chose the side of the die leading to the higher payout (by 
reporting the side of the die with the larger number of dots = high payout). The payout that 
subjects ultimately received was determined by selecting one of their rolls at random, by 
having the experimenter draw a number from 1 to 40 out of an envelope. Subjects earned 
1  EUR for each dot on that particular roll. If subjects were completely honest, they would be 
expected to report deciding on the high side of the die in 50 percent of cases, and the expected 
value of the average payout would be 3.50 EUR. 
Our experiment combines two previously implemented procedures where subjects were paid 
based on the number of dots on reported die rolls (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Jiang, 
2013; Mann et al., 2015). Jiang (2013) designed a die-roll cheating task where subjects 
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reported choosing one side of the die, top or bottom, on a computer screen over multiple 
trials. Subjects were told to mentally select a side of the die before each roll, but recorded 
their choice only after seeing the outcome. In the experiment by Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013), subjects were asked to roll a physical die and memorize the first roll. They were 
further instructed to roll the die another couple of times to test whether the die was fair, but to 
memorize only the first roll and report it later on a computer screen. In this setting, cheating 
was revealed if subjects reported a number different from the outcome of the first roll. In our 
experiment, subjects could cheat in two ways: by misreporting the side they had previously 
memorized and by making up a roll outcome altogether. The latter is identified if the 
combined frequency of any two sides of the die (3-4, 2-5 and 1-6) significantly deviates from 
1/3. 
After the cheating task, we informed subjects that they would have an opportunity to donate 
all or parts of their earnings to a hospital. As they came into the citizen center, subjects were 
randomly allocated into one of two conditions. In condition 1, subjects could donate all or 
part of their earnings to a hospital in Leipzig / East Germany. In condition 2, they could 
donate all or part of their earnings to a hospital in Hannover / West Germany. Both hospitals 
are publically funded and are located in cities of comparable size and with similar average 
incomes.2 To avoid any influence of the experimenters on the donations, we handed a small 
card with some information about the donation opportunity to the subjects and let them 
privately donate using another envelope that they sealed and left at their clipboard. 
Appendix B contains an English translation of the donation treatments. Similar to the study by 
Pfarr et al. (2013), the cheating task and the donation opportunity allowed us to analyze the 
revealed preferences of subjects.  
Finally, we invited subjects to take part in a survey. It was only at this point that subjects 
indicated their East or West German background, by answering the following questions: “In 
which city were you born?”, “Where did you live in the 1980s?”, “Where did you live in the 
1990s?”, “What is your family background?”, “Where are you currently living?” and “How 
do you consider yourself?”. While responses to these questions overlapped to a great extent, 
the overlap was not perfect.   
                                                
2  Leipzig had 520,838 inhabitants in 2012 and employees earned an average wage of 31,766 EUR in the year 
2010; Hannover had 514,137 inhabitants in 2012 and employees earned an average wage of 33,157 EUR in 
the year 2010 (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder: Berechnungsstand August 2012/Februar 
2013). 
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For our main analysis, we consider family background to be our most appropriate measure of 
East or West German heritage. In response to the self-identification question, 84 percent of 
participants indicated that they neither consider themselves as East or West German, but 
merely as German. Place of living does not directly disclose how strongly subjects were 
exposed to socialism or capitalism, as they could have moved to one region or another in the 
1990s or from anywhere in the world to West Germany before 1989. Another problem with 
the place of birth and place of living measures is that some people might not have a German 
family background at all. For instance, many young Turks were born in West Germany, but 
do not have an East or West German family background. The following analyses are therefore 
reported on the family background dimension, which measures the self-perceived cultural 
heritage of subjects. 
Overall, 90 subjects reported having an East German family background and 98 subjects 
having a West German family background. Five subjects who reported an East German 
family background were born in West Germany, thus indicating that their families migrated to 
West Germany at some point in time. One subject who reported a West German family 
background was born in East Germany.3  
4. Results 
4.1. Cheating 
Since we were using a physical cup and a die in the cheating task, subjects could potentially 
cheat on two dimensions. First, subjects could have reported the high side when they had in 
fact chose in advance the side of the die that turned out to have the lower-paying outcome. 
For example, if a subject chose top and after rolling the die the top side showed 2 dots, she 
could have cheated by reporting 5 dots (shown on the bottom side) instead. Second, subjects 
could have simply made up any roll outcome. For example, if a subject chose top and after 
rolling the die the top side showed 2 dots, although instructed differently, she could have 
cheated by reporting 6 instead. This second type of cheating is revealed if the combined 
frequency of any two sides of the die (3-4, 2-5 and 1-6) significantly deviates from 1/3. 
Our results reveal that on average both groups cheated on the first dimension. West Germans 
reported 55 percent high rolls on average, while East Germans reported on average 60 percent 
                                                
3  Since she lived in West Germany throughout the 1980s and 1990s, had a West German family background 
and considered herself as West German, we did not exclude here from the sample and recognized her West 
German family background and attributed her East German place of birth in 1944 to the turmoil of WWII. 
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high rolls, which are both significantly different from the pure chance outcome of a fair die on 
a simple t-test (p<0.01), Moreover, East Germans cheated significantly more than West 
Germans (p=0.01). West Germans rolled on average 3.68 dots, while East Germans rolled on 
average 3.83 dots (p=0.02). Since the scale of possible cheating ranges from 50 percent high 
rolls to 100 percent high rolls, cheating by West Germans corresponds to 10 percent and 
cheating by East Germans to 20 percent of what had been feasible. Thus, East Germans 
cheated twice as much as West Germans overall. These results are also significant on a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U test (p=0.02). When considering the dots that contributed more 
or less to the overall difference in cheating, East Germans reported on average 4, 5 and 6 dots 
more frequently than West Germans. However, East Germans mainly differed from West 
Germans by reporting 5 dots more frequently (p=0.01).  
[Table 2 around here] 
If people were cheating on the second dimension by simply making up rolls, we could detect 
this type of cheating if the combined numbers of rolls with 3 or 4 dots, rolls with 2 or 5 dots, 
and rolls with 1 or 6 dots were not equally distributed. Using the combined rolls enabled us to 
control for the first dimension of cheating, while at the same time identifying the second 
dimension. For instance, if subjects reported 6 dots when the outcome was in fact 1 dot, the 
combined rolls would still have the same probability of occurring, namely 1/3. On the other 
hand, if the combined rolls of 6 and 1 were reported more often than the combined rolls of 5 
and 2 or 4 and 3, this could only be attributed to subjects making up rolls (presumably 6 dots). 
The distribution of rolls suggests that, if at all, subjects invented rolls only on rare occasions.  
Rolls with 3 or 4 dots combined appeared only slightly less frequently than rolls with 1 or 6 
dots combined. This effect was marginally significant (p<0.07).  Importantly, East and West 
Germans did not differ on this second dimension of cheating. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
In order to control for confounding variables, we ran Probit regressions with high or low rolls 
as the dependent variable. We used the random effects estimator to account for clustering of 
specific effects within individuals.  
We collected individual demographic data on several of variables of interest to include in our 
analyses. According to previous research, men are significantly more likely than women to lie 
to secure a monetary benefit (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008), while women are more likely to 
engage in pro-social lying (DePaulo et al., 1996; Erat and Gneezy, 2011). In a classic study of 
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morality, education was related to lower levels of cheating (Hartshorne et al., 1929). To 
capture the effect of economic well being, we asked subjects to report their subjective 
standard of living on a 6-item scale ranging from poor to very well off. Intentionally, we did 
not ask subjects for their precise household income, as such a variable might be an imprecise 
measure of perceived wealth, which depends on the social environment that historically 
differed for East and West Germans. Marital status might also affect individual cheating 
behavior, although to our knowledge this relationship has not yet been explored. Heineck and 
Süssmuth (2010) found that of socialism in East Germany led to lower levels of trust. As a 
lack of trust might promote individual cheating, we included a trust question from the World 
Value Survey (World Values Survey, 2010-2012). We also included a dummy variable 
indicating whether subjects believed that East Germans have been betrayed by West Germans 
after the reunification of Germany, as being treated unfairly by others was shown to positively 
influence individual cheating behavior (Houser et al., 2012). Altogether, our Probit models 
included variables for age, gender, education, political orientation, living standard, marital 
status, trust in East and West Germans, and beliefs that West Germans cheated the East. 
Table 3 shows the results of our initial Probit regressions. To allow for an intuitive 
interpretation, we report marginal effects at the means of the independent variables. The 
estimates reveal that when we control for other potential predictors of cheating, an East 
German family background increases the probability that subjects reported the high side by 18 
percent (p=0.03). Age also has a significant impact on cheating. At the age of 39, being an 
additional year older increases the probability of subjects reporting the high side by 0.7 
percent (p<0.01). Moreover, in line with the findings of Hartshorne et al. (1929) higher levels 
of education reduce the degree of cheating. If subjects had obtained a Master’s degree as 
compared to a Bachelor’s degree, this reduces the probability of subjects reporting the high 
side by 6 percent (p=0.03). None of the other explanatory variables have a statistically 
significant effect on cheating. Since the variable marital status can only be measured on the 
nominal level, we define a different model with specific marital categories. Our results remain 
largely unaffected by this change and no specific martial category has a significant effect on 
cheating.4 
[Table 3 around here] 
                                                
4  We compared the martial status of being in a relationship, married and divorced to the remaining four 
categories pooled together as they all refer to people living by themselves and were reported by very few 
subjects (except for being single). 
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If socialism has an effect on individuals’ honesty, we would expect people who have had 
greater exposure to socialism to cheat more. We therefore analyze whether East Germans who 
were at least 20 years old (born before 1970) when the Berlin Wall came down show higher 
levels of cheating as compared to subjects who were less than 10 years old at the time (born 
before 1980), or those who were simply born before the dissolution of the GDR. As an 
interaction term of age and family background is not informative in a non-linear model like 
Probit (Greene 2010, Ai and Norton 2003), we decided to investigate the exposure to 
socialism by examining these distinct age cohorts separately.5 In line with the theory that 
exposure to socialism impacts dishonesty, the results showed that differences in cheating are 
greater in older cohorts. While in the overall sample East German subjects were 19 percent 
more likely to report the high side of the die than their West German counterparts, subjects 
who lived less than 10 years in socialism were 28 percent more likely, and subjects who lived 
for 20 years or more in socialism were 65 percent more likely. 
[Table 4 around here] 
Lastly, we considered that subjects might change their cheating behavior over time as they 
roll the die over and over. Conceivably, the higher level of cheating observed in East 
Germans could be due to their adapting to the task and cheating more over time even if their 
initial dishonesty was identical. To test whether such dynamics drive our results, we 
investigate the average rolls as well as the percentage of high rolls individuals reported for 
each of the 40 rolls. While we again detect a higher level of cheating for East Germans, we do 
not observe a significant autocorrelation either overall or in any of the two subgroups. 
Moreover, when we split the sample in half, the amount of cheating in the first and second 
half of the task is the same, i.e. there is neither an increase nor decrease in cheating behavior 
while the task was conducted (p=0.68).  
[Figure 2 around here] 
4.2. Donations 
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) were among the first to investigate how social norms are 
shaped by the economic and political systems of East and West Germany, by looking at the 
differences in solidarity between East and West German students in a laboratory experiment. 
                                                
5  In unreported regressions, which we specified as in Table 3 but included an additional interaction term of 
age and family background, we found the interaction of an East German family background with an age of 
being at least 20 years or older in 1989 to be the only significant predictor of cheating behavior.  
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In this experiment, students played a solidarity game, developed by Selten and Ockenfels 
(1998), in which they could hand over parts of their potential winnings to prospective losers. 
The study reported that West German students handed significantly higher amounts to 
anonymous losers than East German students. However, West German students also expected 
significantly higher amounts from anonymous winner than East German students. Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) relied on survey data from the GSOEP and found that East Germans 
stated stronger preferences for public policies that entail some form of redistribution. While 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) calculated that political values would converge 20 to 40 
years after the German reunification, Borsig-Koch et al. (2011) found evidence that social 
behavior changes much more slowly, which may be due to the intergenerational transmission 
of behavioral norms.  
The donation part of our experiment contributes to the previous literature in multiple ways. 
First, we investigate the decision of subjects from the general public instead of a student 
sample, who might have specific preferences for redistribution due to their lower income or 
specific political orientation. In another study, we found that German students cheat more 
than the German general public, which might reflect their stronger economic need to cheat 
(Mann et al., 2015). Second, in our study we had subjects from the general public actually 
reveal their preferences for redistribution by having them donate instead of reporting their 
redistribution preferences in a survey. Previous studies by Pfarr et al. (2013) have shown that 
East Germans desire higher levels of redistribution but are at the same time not willing to 
equally contribute to the financing through taxation. Third, we provide a more refined 
analysis of preferences for redistribution by controlling for the purpose of the donation, i.e. 
supporting a hospital in East or West Germany.  
We first compare the overall donations by East and West Germans. Both groups donated a 
considerable and rather similar share of their earnings. East Germans donated on average 72 
percent of their earning (2.47 EUR), while West Germans donated 70 percent (2.39 EUR). 
The difference is statistically not significant (p=0.75). East Germans donated somewhat more 
to the hospital in West Germany, although this difference is again statistically not significant 
(p=0.66). Interestingly, despite increasing sentiments against the solidarity tax 
(Solidaritätszuschlag) as well as the equalization payments on the federal level (Solidarpakt I 
and II), which East and West Germans have been paying for over 20 years to reconstruct East 
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Germany, and despite claims that it is now time to invest in the West German infrastructure6, 
there is some evidence that West Germans donated a larger amount of their earnings to the 
hospital in East Germany. Specifically, West Germans donated 65 percent of their earnings to 
the hospital in Hannover / West Germany (2.06 EUR) and 74 percent to the hospital in 
Leipzig / East Germany (2.73 EUR) (p=0.07). 
Finally, we check whether high cheaters donate more. If high cheaters indeed donate more, 
this might demonstrate a specific type of moral cleansing (Lee and Schwarz, 2010; Zhong and 
Liljenquist, 2006). However, dividing the sample in subjects who had on average 50 percent 
high rolls or less and those subjects who had on average more than 50 percent high rolls 
(potential cheaters), we did not find any difference in donations (p=0.52).  
4.3. Social Trust 
Heineck and Süssmuth (2010) investigated the effect of socialism on individuals’ trust and 
risk. They found East Germans to be more risk loving and reported that East Germans 
demonstrate a lower level of social trust. We used a more fine-grained measure of social trust 
by distinguishing between trust in East and West Germans. The survey asked each subject the 
following two questions: “Generally speaking, would you say that East Germans can be 
trusted?” as well as “Generally speaking, would you say that West Germans can be trusted?”. 
Our results add support to Heineck and Süssmuth’s (2013) finding that social trust in East and 
West Germany has not yet converged. However, we also find that East Germans and West 
Germans do not differ in their trust of East Germans, but only in their trust of West Germans, 
with East Germans reporting significantly more distrust (p<0.01). This raises the question 
whether East Germans show less social trust due to their exposure to socialism or due to their 
experiences and social comparisons after German reunification. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
From 1961 to 1989, the Berlin Wall divided one nation into two distinct political regimes. We 
exploited this natural experiment to investigate whether the socio-political context impacts 
individual honesty. Using an abstract die-rolling task, we find evidence that East Germans 
who were exposed to socialism cheat more than West Germans who were exposed to 
capitalism. We also find that cheating is more likely to occur under circumstances of 
                                                
6  See for instance the debate about the Solidaritätszuschlag in the German media: 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/debatte-um-solidaritaetszuschlag-zeit-fuer-den-aufbau-west-1.1180511. 
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plausibility; subjects were more likely to cheat by misreporting the chosen side of the die than 
by making up rolls altogether. These results suggest that most people are motivated to hide 
their dishonesty – either from others (Hao and Houser, 2011) or from themselves (Mazar et 
al., 2008). In contrast to the effects of East or West German background on cheating, we did 
not observe an overall difference between East and West Germans in prosocial behavior 
(donations to hospitals). However, given that West Germans donated marginally more to East 
German hospitals than West German hospitals, future studies exploring socio-political 
influences on prosocial behavior should consider the identities of both subjects and recipients.  
We interpret our findings as evidence that the political regime of socialism has a lasting 
impact on citizens’ basic morality. However, alternative explanations are also possible. One 
such alternative is that cheating tendencies reflect lasting impacts of economic scarcity. 
Although economic scarcity was a by-product of the socialist regime in East Germany, this 
explanation is distinct from attributing cheating differences to socialism itself. While we 
cannot entirely rule out the role of persisting economic differences, which could for example 
originate from East Germans historically not inheriting assets such as land lots or large and 
medium size companies that would have allowed them to accumulate wealth over time, we 
did not observe differences between individuals with East and West Germans backgrounds in 
education or self-reported standard of living. Most importantly, in our study, subjects’ self-
reported standard of living did not predict their cheating behavior. 
Another alternative explanation for our results is that the differences in dishonesty are due to 
effects of post-regime social comparison. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Germans became 
sharply aware of the socio-political and economic differences on either side of the divide. As 
previous research has shown, people exposed to upward social comparisons are more likely to 
cheat in unrelated tasks (Gino and Pierce, 2009; John et al., 2013), as are people who believe 
that they were treated unfairly by others (Houser et al., 2012). Thus, the differences in 
cheating we observed could be due to East Germans’ upward social comparisons and feelings 
of injustice after the re-unification of Germany. In line with this interpretation, our survey 
showed that East Germans report less trust in West Germans than in East Germans a quarter 
century after German reunification. However, trust was not related to cheating behavior in our 
Probit model, suggesting that this is not the main variable impacting our results. Furthermore, 
we observed that family background is most predictive of cheating for individuals born before 
1970, indicating that greater exposure to socialism predicts greater dishonesty. 
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If socialism promotes individual dishonesty, the specific features of this socio-political system 
that lead to this outcome remain to be determined. The East German socialist regime differed 
from the West German capitalist regime in several important ways. First, the system did not 
reward work based to merit, and made it difficult to accumulate wealth or pass anything on to 
one’s family. This may have resulted in a lack of meaning leading to demoralization (Ariely 
et al., 2008), and perhaps less concern for upholding standards of honesty. Furthermore, while 
the government claimed to exist in service of the people, it failed to provide functional public 
systems or economic security. Observing this moral hypocrisy in government may have 
eroded the value citizens placed on honesty. Finally, and perhaps most straightforwardly, the 
political and economic system pressured people to work around official laws and cheat to 
game the system. Over time, individuals may come to normalize these types of behaviors. 
Given these distinct possible influences, further research will be needed to understand which 
aspects of socialism have the strongest or most lasting impacts on morality. 
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Table 1 Explanatory Variables Summary Statistics 
 20 
 
Table 2  Dependent Variable Summary Statistics 
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Table 3 Probit-Regressions  
 
Subject random effects, n(subjects) 123, n(rolls) 4920, p(휒²)0.001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Probit-Regressions Age Effects 
 
Subject random effects, p(휒²)<0.001. 
 
Dependent variable High roll High roll
Marginal 
effect mean p-value
Marginal 
effect mean p-value
East German Family 0.176 0.5 .025 0.187 0.5 .017
Age 0.007 39.5 .043 0.008 39.5 .019
Female 0.037 0.4 .649 0.035 0.4 .671
Trust in East Germans 0.039 2.1 .142 0.041 2.1 .122
Trust in West Germans - 0.039 2.6 .077 - 0.042 2.6 .054
West Germans Cheated - 0.012 0.3 .746 - 0.060 0.3 .128
Education - 0.061 3.9 .038 - 0.060 3.9 .039
Political left-right spectrum 0.007 3.4 .724 0.009 3.4 .670
Living standard - 0.020 2.8 .639 - 0.030 2.8 .477
Marital status - 0.148 2.2 .091
Relationship - 0.076 0.4 .418
Married - 0.131 0.2 .253
Divorced - 0.112 0.1 .458
Dependent variable High roll High roll High roll
Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value
East German Family 0.227 0.194 0.106 0.296 0.046 0.599
Age 0.008 0.041 0.005 0.203 0.001 0.749
East German Family * Born Before 1989 - 0.060 0.742
East German Family * Born Before 1980 0.142 0.289
East German Family * Born Before 1970 0.430 0.005
Female 0.034 0.680 0.033 0.687 0.045 0.569
Trust in East Germans 0.038 0.151 0.036 0.177 0.025 0.331
Trust in West Germans - 0.039 0.078 - 0.036 0.108 - 0.027 0.205
West Germans Cheated - 0.147 0.095 - 0.157 0.074 - 0.167 0.050
Education - 0.060 0.772 - 0.060 0.039 - 0.054 0.058
Political left-right spectrum 0.005 0.040 0.009 0.644 - 0.054 0.489
Living standard - 0.018 0.798 - 0.024 0.562 - 0.011 0.784
Marital status - 0.011 0.667 - 0.016 0.666 - 0.042 0.271
Dependent variable High roll High roll High roll
(born before 1989, n=110) (born before 1980, n=67) (born before 1970, n=41)
Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value
East German Family 0.185 0.034 0.284 0.033 0.650 0.001
Age 0.008 0.036 0.009 0.179 - 0.011 0.345
Female 0.034 0.706 0.072 0.603 0.223 0.275
Trust in East Germans 0.033 0.264 0.026 0.509 0.032 0.600
Trust in West Germans - 0.038 0.104 - 0.033 0.332 - 0.035 0.501
West Germans Cheated - 0.142 0.122 - 0.255 0.049 - 0.035 0.070
Education - 0.054 0.805 - 0.115 0.008 - 0.076 0.201
Political left-right spectrum 0.009 0.086 0.022 0.499 0.037 0.380
Living standard - 0.009 0.681 - 0.088 0.189 - 0.113 0.244
Marital status - 0.010 0.583 - 0.020 0.716 - 0.166 0.023
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Figure 1 Reported Roles by East and West German Family Background (the red line refers to 
the fair outcome of 16.6 percent and 33.3 percent, respectively). 
Reported rolls of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
  
All rolls for East and West Germans (as well as both groups combined) are statistically 
different from the 16.6 percent baseline for outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 at a p<0.05 level, with 
the exception of rolls of 3, 4 and 5 for West Germans only. 
Reported rolls of 3-4, 2-5 and 1-6 combined 
  
Frequencies of two-side combinations for East and West Germans (as well as both groups 
combined) are generally not statistically different from the 33.3 percent baseline.  
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Figure 2 Dynamics of Cheating Behavior 
 
Mean roll outcome 
  
 
 
 
 
Percentage of high rolls 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description  
Age  Subjects age as of January 1, 2014. 
Education  Reply to the question ‘What is the highest level of education you 
have completed?’. 0 = none, 1 = ‘Hauptschule’ (lower level high 
school), 2 = ‘Realschule’ (high school), 3 = ‘Abitur / Fachabitur’ 
(some college), 4 = ‘Bachelor / Fachhochschulabschluss’ (3-4 years 
of university), 5 = ‘Master / Diplom’ (4-5 years of university) and 6 
= ‘Promotion / Aufbaustudium’ (doctoral degree, post-graduate 
degree). 
Family Background 0 = Subject indicated to have an East German family background. 
1 = Subject indicated to have a West German family background. 
Female Gender, 1 = female, 0 = male. 
High roll 0 = Subject reported that they had rolled a 1, 2 or 3. 
1 = Subject reported that they had rolled a 4, 5 or 6. 
Living standard Reply to the question ‘What describes your standard of living?’ on a 
scale from 1 = very well off to 6 = poor. 
Marital status Reply to the question ‘What is your marital status’. 1 = single, 2 = In 
a relationship, 3 = married , 4 = separated, 5 = divorced, 6 = 
widowed, 7 = other. 
Political spectrum Reply to the question ‘In political matters, people talk of “the left” 
and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking?’ from 0 = left to right = 10. 
Trust East Opinion on the statement ‘Generally speaking, would you say that 
East Germans can be trusted?’ on a scale from 0 = most East 
Germans can be trusted to 10 = you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with East Germans. 
Trust West Opinion on the statement ‘Generally speaking, would you say that 
West Germans can be trusted?’ on a scale from 0 = most West 
Germans can be trusted to 10 = you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with West Germans. 
West cheated Reply to the question ‘Would you agree that West Germans cheated 
East Germans after the fall of the Berlin Wall?’. 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
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Appendix B 
 
Instructions: Donations 
The hospital of Hannover [Leipzig] located in West Germany [East Germany] is a public 
body and stands for local medicine and care, high quality treatment, as well as sophisticated 
diagnostics and therapy within a single institution. Giving its traditional duty, the hospital 
regards itself as an institution that constitutes a medical-social center. Next to pure medical 
care, the closeness to people is at the core of the hospital’s work. The clinic therefore also 
administers social services especially for West German [East German] patients and relatives 
and currently expands this service. To continue with that work, the hospital of Hannover 
[Leipzig] depends next to public funding also on public donations. Please donate for the 
patients and relatives in West Germany [East Germany]. 
